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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF JOSEPH GRIFFIN
AND CRYSTAL WITTERICK
QUESTION, MR. YOSOWITZ: Thank you very much for the very in-
formative commentaries. I have a couple of questions before we open it to
the floor. I was wondering if you, Joe, could just mention something about
what the states are doing in this area? And what about the provinces; is there
anything involved there?
And the second thing is, the blocking statutes and the "clawback" legis-
lation are from the 1980s. Crystal, I heard you say there has been a change in
the tide. The landscape is changing. There is increasing cooperation between
the United States and Canada. And I know that, in the developing countries,
they have asked for U.S. antitrust lawyers to go over and help them develop
antitrust laws and competition laws. All the countries in the former Soviet
Union have U.S. lawyers over there writing competition laws for them. I am
just wondering whether, when you look at the effects doctrine in the United
States and you talk about cartel activity, which makes consumer prices likely
to go up, or inhibits new development in products or new development in
technology, is this not a universal problem, and will the U.S. view really pre-
vail here?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: I will address the question about the states.
Most of the state activity that is relevant internationally is in the context of
mergers. You probably know of some of the more notorious cases where the
federal government has either not objected to or cleared the merger, but the
merger has been blocked by state authorities under state merger law. That is
one of the wonders of our federal system.
It is also interesting to note that the Hartford Fire litigation was brought
by states' attorneys general. That was another good example. Cities had
complained that one of the types of insurance that the Brits were refusing to
offer was liability insurance for public playgrounds because there had been
some outrageous cases of people falling off swings and being awarded $20
million because the foreign insurance companies were willing to pay that
amount. So the foreign insurance companies asked, why should we do that?
Why should we let American juries award those kinds of damages against
us? So they decided not to support that kind of insurance anymore. When
that happened, at first, the state and local governments went to the federal
government and asked to boycott antitrust violations and sue the Brits. The
federal government looked at it and declined to bring any case. The case was
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then brought by the states' attorneys general, who prosecuted it successfully
all the way to the Supreme Court. So there is plenty of precedent for the
states being active and it is a perfectly good point to say you should never
forget our states, particularly the big ones, like New York and California, in
your analysis of what problems you might run into in the United States.
ANSWER, MS. WITTERICK: Sure. Leave me the hard question. First of
all, with respect to provinces, they have absolutely no jurisdiction with re-
spect to competition law. So that was an easy answer. Whether the U.S. view
will prevail, I am not so sure, because the Europeans are becoming more
powerful as they integrate their markets. The competition laws of the Aus-
tralians are much more close in line with those of the Europeans. And, in
fact, Canada's laws are, in a lot of respects, similar to Europe's. I do not
know who is going to win.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I had a question on administration of
antitrust laws and legislation. It seems as though antitrust has suddenly be-
come very much alive under Joel Klein. A lot of this activity has been done
without benefit and change in legislation. Joe, I would like to have you
comment on the new thrust of U.S. antitrust laws in terms of the current
monarch in this area, the U.S. monarch. Do you want to comment on that?
Please comment on the FTC, too.
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Without getting into the sort of debate that
went on in the Reagan administration, the fundamental change for this point
was in the Reagan and Bush administration's so-called Chicago School of
Economists governing antitrust enforcement. The real issue there was con-
sumer welfare defined as choice and innovation and so forth. There again is a
little bit of trivia, but, in the international guidelines that were issued for en-
forcement purposes in 1988, there was a statement in one of the footnotes,
now a famous Footnote 159, that basically said, if anticompetitive conduct
does not have any affect on U.S. consumers, we will not prosecute them.
That was a sort of a philosophical statement.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: Would this have changed from the
previous administrations?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Yes. What happened was there was a change
from 1977, when they said, we will prosecute it. And then in 1988, they said,
we will not. When the late Bush and Klein administrations came in 1995 they
made a big show of reversing, rescinding, repudiating, and disavowing Foot-
note 159. That is the point I was trying to make. Henry is perfectly right to
point out that it does not make any difference to today's enforcers whether
there is any injury to American consumers or not. That is precisely the mar-
ket access point. The issue is that an American company is free to do what-
ever it wants in the United States. There is no issue about consumer injury in
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the United States. Then they want access to the Canadian market, and the
Canadians will not give it to them. They are going to sue because denial of
access is defined to be an antitrust violation, even though there is no injury at
all to American consumers. This is an important change.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: Without legislation?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Without legislation. Purely executive fiat.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: So it is back to the good old days?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Back to the good old days. That is right, days
of unrestrained enforcement.
COMMENT, MS. VERDUN: I am with the Canadian Department of
Industry. The competition tribunal is part of that. One of the things that my
department is doing is working on electronic commerce. Canada will be
hosting an OECD conference in electronic commerce in October, so we have
a bunch of officials busily working on that agenda, and part of that includes
looking at the legal framework that is necessary for electronic commerce.
I would be very interested in views from both panelists on how you see
electronic commerce affecting the law and enforcement of antitrust and com-
petition law, and whether you see particular problems arising over the next,
say, five years? You talked about computer searches and presumably that
will be exacerbated and become more of an issue with electronic commerce.
I would be interested in your views on this.
COMMENT, MS. WITIERICK: There are several members of my de-
partment whose job it is to study electronic commerce and to think about
what is being done over the Internet. We do have some common attempts on
enforcing the Internet as an international supervisory network of antitrust
officials around the world. We get together and exchange ideas, discuss is-
sues, and do sweeps of the Internet. But the real problem is jurisdiction. If
you have someone who is disseminating information from Japan, perfectly in
accordance with their laws, but it breaches U.S. or Canadian laws, how do
you address that? Do you take jurisdiction? I know what the U.S. answer is.
But the Canadian answer is not so clear.
The other problem, and it is not really an antitrust problem, is with en-
cryption. If you encrypt the data that you send over the Internet, how do you
get access to the keys to open up that data, especially if the company is lo-
cated, as I said, in Japan? You could carry on a full-fledged price fixing
agreement over the Internet and, if it is all encrypted, there is no way of de-
tecting that or getting the relevant information.
COMMENT, MR. GRIFFIN: Let me tell you about a wonderful case.
This is just too good to pass up. I do not know if you are aware of this in
your studies, if not you should get a copy of it. It goes by the wonderful title
Playboy v. Playman. In the early 1980s, long before anybody ever heard of
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the Internet, there was an Italian knock-off publication of Playboy Magazine
called Playman. It was published in Italy, and they produced an English lan-
guage edition for distribution in Europe. It was basically a copy of Playboy
Magazine.
Playboy brought trademark, copyright, and all sorts of infringement ac-
tions against this company. The case was settled in New York in the early
1980s by a decree that said, you may do what you want to do in Italy, but you
cannot distribute anything in the United States that in any way infringes upon
any of Playboy's rights. That was in 1981, I think.
Fast forward to last year when Playman opened a site on the Internet. It
was available to anybody. People in the United States started calling up and
getting pictures and articles off of the Web site. Playboy brought a contempt
action again Playman, saying that what they were doing was in violation of
the consent decree. Not unreasonably, Playman defended by saying it could
not possibly be a violation of the consent decree because the Internet did not
exist at the time of the consent decree, so no one could have contemplated
that the decree was meant to apply to the Internet. And, by the way, even if
you put that issue aside, they are sitting in Italy minding their own business.
How could they possibly be infringing on Playboy's trademarks and copy-
rights in the United States? Anybody want to guess on the result in the
United States court? Guilty. The court held that there was an infringement,
that the making available of the address so that you could call up and get the
information was distribution within the words of the consent decree, and
therefore, was a violation of the decree.
QUESTION, MR. FITZ-JAMES: Did they advertise their address in the
United States?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: I think you can get it through a search engine.
They did not advertise in that sense. It was available through a search engine.
If you call up say, pictures of naked women, one of the things you got was
Playman in Italy. That kind of thing.
QUESTION, MR. WENDLANDT: Just a question. In that judgment, was
there discussion as to the distributing cities of the Web site, per se?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Yes.
QUESTION, MR. WENDLANDT: What did the court conclude?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Well, the court sidestepped. It was a very
interesting opinion by the judge. But what I understand is, somebody sitting
in New York can do something that calls up these pictures on a screen in
New York. That sounds like distribution in New York to me. I do not under-
stand where cyberspace is. It is a layman's view, that if you can look at it in
New York, that constitutes distribution in New York.
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COMMENT, MS. WITTERICK: I have a response, because I disagree
with that approach. That means if I am a company and I advertise in Canada
on the Internet, and I am really directing my advertising to Canadians, and I
comply with Canadian advertising laws, and I engage in comparative adver-
tising, for example, not that comparative advertising is not legal in Canada
and the United States, but there are jurisdictions in which it is not legal. Am I
supposed to comb every single jurisdiction where people might have a com-
puter and ensure that I comply with their laws? There has to be some kind of
defense to that.
COMMENT, MR. GRIFFIN: I have got a case right on point.
QUESTION, MS. WITTERICK: What if you include a waiver, or what if
you include appropriate disclaimer language? What is the United States go-
ing to do?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: Let me give you the other side of this. This is
a real case, it has not been reported, but it is a case that I was involved in.
There is no decision. But I can tell you the facts, just to show that we are not
the only people who do this.
You are absolutely right and your example is apropos. Comparative ad-
vertising is illegal in Germany. One of the largest American computer com-
panies was challenged by the German government when they advertised in
German magazines and German technical magazines. They showed a picture
of their computer, presented some stuff about their computer, and said if you
would like more information about our computer, here's our Web site. There
was the address of the Web site at the bottom of the page. If you called up
the Web site, what you got was comparative advertising; our computer ver-
sus all the other computers. The German government took the position that
that was a violation of German law, even though the American computer
company happened to be sitting in the state of Washington, if that gives you
any clues. The argument by the German government was, why did you put
the Web site in the advertisement? If you had not put the Web site in the ad-
vertisement, then maybe it would have been different. So it is not just the
United States who notices this.
QUESTION, MR. LADD: I have a question about the Canadian impact
of the fax paper decision. Once the United States had uncovered this heinous
price-fixing conspiracy, was this ignored in Canada? Seemingly, this distri-
bution also occurred north of the border in North America, and there must
have been an opportunity for an official enforcement? Or does Canada have a
private cause of action, and perhaps even treble damages? Where are the
private plaintiffs in this action?
ANSWER, MS. WHITERICK: We actually convicted a number of people
in that case in Canada. There were no private actions. There really are no
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private actions in Canada. We are very quiet and calm, and we do not like to
sue people. We like to cooperate with the government, you know. We now
recently have enacted a class action proceeding. We have had a couple of
class actions, Bryax was number one. There is very, very little private litiga-
tion under our competition law, probably because mergers are not actionable
on the civil side. Only the director can challenge a merger, so the place
where you probably see the most is not available.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I have one other question, since
Crystal raised the question about who is going to prevail, the Europeans or
the Americans, I might ask Joe the question, what are the differences be-
tween the U.S. approach and the European approach? It seems to me that,
and if I remember correctly and I think I do, the Europeans have exercised
some extraterritoriality against Japanese firms where the effects were felt in
Europe. Now what is the difference, Joe?
ANSWER, MR. GRIFFIN: I do not know if that was intended to softball
or not, but I have written two articles on exactly that point. It has been a per-
sonal hobbyhorse of mine because I opened and ran our Brussels office for
two years, so thank you for asking me. The leading precedent in Europe is
the Wood Pulp Cartel case in 1988. There, the court said any conspiracy that
is implemented, and that is the word, implemented, in the European Union is
actionable, no matter where the parties are, no matter whether they are E.U.
companies or not, or whether they have offices in the E.U. or not.
That case involved a worldwide cartel for wood pulp that involved a
number of people who were outside the European Union; had no facilities in
the European Union, and in one case, had no sales in the European Union.
But they were part of the cartel that agreed to allocations of territories and so
forth.
That still remains the verbiage today by the court. The court uses the
word implement in the community or in the union. The European commis-
sion position is virtually indistinguishable from the American position. It is
more interesting that the commission and the court do not agree on this point.
The commission asserts a broader jurisdiction which is American-like. The
Americans talk about effect. What is the difference? The best example I can
give you is a boycott outside the country where you would see a difference in
the result. Assume for the sake of argument, some Canadian and Japanese
companies get together and say let's agree we will not sell our product to
America and to the European Union, for whatever reason. Under American
law you would say, there is an effect here, the effect is the boycott, either
prevention or diminution or elimination of sales, whatever the facts are.
There is clearly an effect here. We clearly have jurisdiction and, in fact, there
are cases, most of them against the Japanese reflecting exactly those facts,
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cartels organized outside the United States refusing to sell. When I talked to
at least three different judges of the European Court of Justice about those
facts, they said that is not implementation. I have not given you any facts
about implementation in the European Union. So that presumably when that
case got - although I think the Europe Commission would bring a case and
would find those cartels in violation, I think when it got to the court, unless
the court changes its mind, it would say, there is no implementation.
But that is a very, very narrow range of cases when you are down in the
one, two, three-percent difference in cases. So some people have argued it is
not a significant difference. I think that on the broader issue of who wins, one
of the two issues is the time frame, over what period of time.
Frankly, I do not think it is a political issue or a party issue. I would not
expect whoever the next president is and the next attorney general and the
next chairman of the FTC would make any difference at all on this issue.
The closest press I could think of, Henry, is the U.N. exercises in the late
1970s and early 1980s on the model antitrust law, the model law on transfer
of technologies. The model law on transfer of technologies was aborted pre-
cisely because the Americans would not go along with what the views of the
less-developed world regarding transfers of technology. The U.N. code is an
example of the lowest common denominator where the Americans signed up
for a bunch of wonderfully nebulous principles, and it has never had any
affect at all in U.S. commerce. I think that the Americans will participate in
these negotiations. But I think, frankly, in today's environment, if everybody
else in the world had one definition of extraterritoriality, and we had another,
we would pursue ours. It is precisely because, as somebody else mentioned a
little earlier today, we are the big guy on the street. The real question is, can
you do business with us; not, can we do business with you?
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